Saturday, October 31, 2009

Draft: From Possible Worlds to Possible Universes

I have uploaded a draft of a paper I've been working on on and off for quite a while. The paper develops a complete unorthodox possible-world analysis of modal sentences that can deal with modal possible-world sentences (i.e. sentences such as 'It is possible that there is a possible world at which there are talking donkeys'). I'd be interested to hear what people think about it. (For the record, as many of you already know, I believe that no possible world analysis of modal sentences is correct--the truthmakers for true modal propositions are irreducibly modal features of the actual world, not possible worlds)

In particular, I'd like to get some feedback on the argument I develop in Section 2. Most people don't seem to take modal possible-world sentences very seriously, but, if they take non-modal possible-world sentences seriously, I think they should. My main reason for thinking so is that, if basic modal sentences (e.g. ‘It is not possible that there are talking donkeys’)) are correctly analyzed as non-modal possible world sentences (i.e. ‘At no possible world, there are talking donkeys’)) (and incidentally I think they are not), then complex modal sentences (e.g. ‘It is possible that it is not possible that there are talking donkeys’)) should be analyzed as modal possible-world sentences (i.e. ‘It is possible that, at no possible world, there are talking donkeys’).

In my argument, I focus on that example and argue that, if 'It is not possible that there are talking donkeys’ is true if and only if there is no possible world at which there are talking donkeys, then ‘It is possible that it is not possible that there are talking donkeys’ is true if and only if it is possible that there is no possible world at which there are talking donkeys.

The argument for, if ‘It is possible that it is not possible that there are talking donkeys’ is true, then it is possible that there is no possible world at which there are talking donkeys goes like this.
  1. ‘It is possible that it is not possible that there are talking donkeys’ is true. (A)
  2. [It is necessary that] 'It is not possible that there are talking donkeys’ is true if and only if there is no possible world at which there are talking donkeys. (A)
  3. For all p, ‘It is possible that p’ is true if and only if it is possible that ‘p’ is true. (A)
  4. For all p and q, if [it is necessary that] p if and only if q, then it is possible that p if and only if it is possible that q. (A)
  5. It is possible that ‘It is not possible that there are talking donkeys’ is true. (from 1 and 4)
  6. It is possible that there is no possible world at which there are talking donkeys. (from 2, 3 and 5)
Here is the argument for the converse claim—if it is possible that, at no possible world, there are talking donkeys, then ‘It is possible that it is not possible that there are talking donkeys’ is true.

  1. It is possible that, at no possible world, there are talking donkeys. (A)
  2. [It is necessary that] 'It is not possible that there are talking donkeys’ is true if and only if at no possible world, there are talking donkeys. (A)
  3. For all p and q, if [it is necessary that] p if and only if q, then it is possible that p if and only if it is possible that q. (A)
  4. For all p, ‘It is possible that p’ is true if and only if it is possible that ‘p’ is true. (A)
  5. It is possible that 'It is not possible that there are talking donkeys’ is true. (1 and 4).
  6. 'It is possible that it is not possible that there are talking donkeys’ is true. (2, 3 and 5).

Thursday, October 29, 2009

Barnes on Metametaphysics and Metametaphysics

Elizabeth Barnes has a really nice review of Metametaphysics here. Check it out!

Monday, October 5, 2009

New Metaphysics Drafts

I've got three new drafts of metaphysics papers up on my (new) website.

They are:
Balls and All
In this paper I lay out a rather unusual combination of views about spacetime, mereology and material objects. The view is coherent, I claim: and if it is coherent it seems to provide a counterexample to a number of assumptions that are made about what sorts of views have to go together. (In particular I use it to argue against a number of Ted Sider's arguments in his Four-Dimensionalism.)

Disposition Impossible, with C.S. Jenkins
In this paper Carrie and I investigate "unmanifestable dispositions": dispositions to PHI in C, where either PHI is impossible or C is. We argue that objects have such dispositions, and it is a non-trivial matter which ones they have. We also argue that these impossible dispositions play, or can play, significant theoretical roles. If we are right, a number of standard styles of theories of dispositions are in trouble.

The third is a piece of "applied metaphysics", I suppose, at least if work on counterfactuals counts as metaphysics. My impression is that it often is counted that way, even though it is at least as much philosophy of language and philosophy of science:

Why Historians (and Everyone Else) Should Care About Counterfactuals.

I discuss eight good reasons historians can usefully concern themselves with counterfatuals: some have been argued for before by others, but even in these cases I either have different characterisations of exactly why conditionals are important, or have different arguments for their importance in historical method.

Any feedback on any of the three papers would of course be welcome. (Obviously not any feedback. But you know what I mean.)